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INTRODUCTION.

U'.r --" OcAvr.t Y oi"

ST^^Ni^-^AliT i"

Inuictaent ti^® dcfencigrit

of li^vinG, coriaitted ".."'••r Crimes

and Gi'l.«:.s a.,ainst

3 QS defined "by

"tide IX

of Control Gnuncil Xnv; 10, In thet tliey partloipated
in atrocities and offenses, idcluding nurder, cxter-

/aination, enslavement, deportation, inprison-acnt,

killing of hostages,

torture, persecutions on poli-

'ticd, racial end religious grounds, and other inhunanc
end crininal acts against G-er'ien nationals and ic.nh:rs
of the civilian populations of countries and territories
under the belligerent occupation of, or other"wise con

trolled by G.-".:_?ny, plunder of public and private pro

perty, "manton destruction of cities, towns and villages,
e'^d fevastation not justified by nllitary necessity#
This Trial Irief will sat forth the evidence on

-OHTp--,.. ticipation in

Crimes and Crimes

aeainst Humanity coiiitted against nationals of

occupied rrancG and Denmark. In two separate Trial
Briefs wo will analyse the cvide^-ce of his partici
pation in the murders of millions of J»-«3 and his
"'.articipation in the maltreatment and .kiilimrg of
.lllicd Prisoners of Xar.

-

1

-

5TEKNGR.\CHTts POSITION MO RESPOMSIBILITY,

STEENGRACHT, in an affidavit of 20 November 1947j Pros, Epdi* 1189^
Doc, Book

"1,)

2o)

p, 40—made the following statement about his personal data;

I was born on 15 November 1902 in Moyland district clove©

I spent the first years of my life partly in Germany, partly
in France, attended elementary school in Moyland and subse-'
quently the high school (humanistisches GyiHiasium) in Clove,
Imatriculated at Easter 1922,

3«)

After this I did agricultural work and at the same time
studied Agriculture, National Economy and Jui'isprudence at
the Agricultural College in Bonn-FJoppelsdorf, Bonn University,
Lausanne and cologne respectively.

4«)

In 1926 I passed the Junior Lav;yerts exam at the District
Court of Appeal in Cologne,

5*)

In 1929"I graduated as Doctor of Law at the University of
Cologne,

6*) At the beginning of 1933 I passed the Hain'State Law examina
tion at the Supreme Court of Appeal Berlin, and was appointed
Assistant Judge, (Gerichtsassessor)

?•)

From 1926 until 1933 I worked at the District Court Clove and
at the District Court of Appeal in Duesseldorf, and in be
tween I was on leave for a long period in order to manage my'
agricultural estate and to perfect my knowledge of languages.

8,) During this time I was also legal advisor to the Free Farmers i
Association in Cleve until approximately 1933»

9«) After this organisation had been incorporated into the Reich
Farmerst Association I retained the same position in the district

farmers T union Clove and v/as local Farmers i Leader in 1935/36,

9.fl) In 1936 I became Agricultural Attache v;ith the German Embassy
in London under the then Ambassador von Ribbentrop,

10,) Following this, I v/as v/orking in the Records Division with the
Embassy in London, I continued v/orking in this department
under Ambassador von Dircksen when Ambassador von Ribbentrop
v/as recalled to Germany.

11.) • In September 1938 J was transferred to Berlin, and after being
appointed Legation secretary worked in the records section.

12,) Xv/as appointed Legation Councillor in April 1939,

13,) From September 1939 onwards at first temporarily I took over
the technical direction of the local headquarters of the then
Foreign'Hinister von Ribbentrop as a member of the records
section.

14«) From the middle of May 1940 in the same capacity I was once
more entrusted v/ith the technical direction of the local head

quarters,

Owing to the fact that the offices were separated

from these in Berlin the local headquarters became an inde
pendent unit.

In this v/ay I became a member of the personal

staff.

15a) W^en the chief adjutant v/as conscripted to military service I
assumed his position'as a deputy in 1941 and was promoted to

minister first class,

I retained the same position until 1943#
-2-

16») From l.iay 1943 I was state secretary of the Foreign Office
having ray headquarters in Berlin*

17-)

I was a raomber of the "Stahlhelm't since 192S,

IS.)

aving to the incorporation of the "Stahlholm" into the SA, I
becarae a raejtiber of the SA and in the sar.ie year joined the
NSD/iP*

19o) For a period of approxiinntoly 5 months at tho turn of the year

1935/36 I deputized for the local Ortsgruppenleiter in uy
native village,

20,)

O-'dng to ray appointment as state secretarj'", the rank of an SA
Brigadefuelircr was conferred upon me on 20 April 1944®

This

was a so-called honorary ranki"

The most importrint date of STESNGPL'iCHT' s career is his appointment

as state secretary of the Foreign Office on 5 11^7 1943^ when he became

WeizsaeckerIs successor^ a position and function he kept until the end of
the war in nay 1945*

Before that date he had been Ribbcntropis private
✓

••

secretary. Adjutant and Master of Ceremonies for several years

(Ex, C-^34^

Doc, Book 205, Po 123), oven as far back as during Ribbcntropis /^gbassador—
ship in London his only distinction being that he attracted the favcrablo
attention of his boss,
✓

In May 1943, his cordial relation wdth Ribbontrop bore spectacular
fruit:

STEENGR/'iCHT v/as catapulted from his position of a personal assis

tant to state Secrotr^rj'- and Deputy of the German Foreign Minister.

All

confidential information e.g, cables and reports from the Qorman repre
sentatives abroad ivere submitted tf the state secretary before thojr wont

to Ribbontrop.

(Exh. 1526, NG-4949, Doc. Book 1),

STEH'JGR/iCHT perused

not only the diplomatic reports, but the summaries of foreign broadcasts
which were compiled in the "goa House" listening station, tho reports of
the SD and the daily bulletins of Gocringis special monitoring service,

(Tr, p. 10640).

TO complete his briefing, ho presided over the daily Direc✓

torsi Conference at v.hich all worthv/hilo novf items, both domestic and foreign

wore analyzed and evaluated,

(Exh, C-417, MG-5083, Bk® 205, P® 1)•

As State Socrotary, STEMGR/'iCHT was the top-ranlcing foreign service
✓

-

official, next to the Minister, controlling the vhole Gorman diplomatic
machinery.

During tho war, Ribbentrop spent most of his time at his Fiold

Headquarters, vjhich was sometimes hundreds of miles away from Berlin,
P- 9895).

(Tr,

During all this time STESWGR/iCHT v/as in charge of the Foreign

Office in Berlin, v/hich handled the bulk of all political affairs,
-3-

It is difficult to spand much time arguing that the highest franking
official permanently controling the Foreign Office and hundreds of .\m-

bassadors^ Ministers^ and diplomats abroad and at home, v/as more than a

ventrilio^uist Is dummy vdthout becoming a little self-conscious.
state such a contention is enough to refute it.

Merely to

Ihe Third Reich did not

pay STEEMGRACHT an annual salary of 6S,600 RM singly to obtain the services

of an inexperienced office-boy.

(ex. 301, I-JG-4150, Blc. Ik-k, P. 110).

But

since STEMGE'.GHT has expended so much energy in his attempt to emphasize
that, the only differences between the State secretary and the janitor in

the Foreign Office were their v;ardrobes and raonthl:/ salaries, we arc forced
to devote some time to this subject.
VJhat were STEESJGR/1CHT

official duties?

As Acting chief of the For-

eign Office, ho was the superior and supervisor of all its various Divisions^
including the political. Economic; Legal, and press Divisions, as well as
^

Departments Inland I and II (Tyoermann Ex, 5^ Woermann Doc. Bk. 1, p. 60).

AH these Divisions xvere subordinated to the Minister and his permanent

Deputy,-)£• (ibid., p, 59-80).

The political Division was in charge of iireign

relations and coordinated the political activities of the other Divisions.

(Ex. 3658, HG-3341, Doc. Bk. 99-A, P- 7)- STEPNGR'.CHT's Under secretary,
k

j\ndor Hcncke, served as Chief of the political Division,

He testified as

a defense vdtncss that STEHIGMHT was his superior (Tr. p. 19484), and that

*

ho submitted matters which were not "routine" to STEMIGn'^CHT. (Tr. 19466).
STEMGRACHT v/as instructed by Ribbentrop at the outset that ho had to en

force "discipline" among the officials of the Foreign Office in Berlin.

(Tr. 9772).

STEEt^GRACHT, as Ribbentrop is Deputy, was the disciplinary

superior of all the officials and employees of the Foreign Missions, such
as, for example, the members of the staff of the Gorman Enibassy in paris.

(Tr, 10639).
^

J

^

Further, as time vrent on, STEEUGR.\CHT increasingly took over the task
of meeting foreign diplomats, and dealt ivith their diplomatic complaints and
representations,

it was STES\TGR.;CIIT ''dio told the ,5k'K3dish Minister, after

he had lodged a strong protest against the deportation of Denish Jews, that
✓

such protests v;ere none of Swedenis affair.
*

'

*

f

(Ex. 1672, HG-4093> Bk. 60-B,P'29),

"Staendigor Vcrtroter", This vras mistranslated "permanent representative"#
It should read; "permanent deputy".

i.iiifi.i tr aivr ii

• iniii fn

i

At the time STEENGR«\CHT was appointed he ivas also instructed by
Ribbentrop that it vras his duty "to protect the interests of the Foreign

Office against ell other agencies vdth ruthless energy"*

(fr. 9772)

Ho

did so with a large amount of pmov and discretionr
In the course of this trial the struggle of the Reich plenipotontiary

in Denmark^ Best^ to obtain more police personnel vras rddely discussjd.

This affair started with an assault upon a German officer in Denmark on
>

•

,

.

•

-

•

August 25, 1943? '(ex* 3619? NG-5106j Bk. 9S-A, P- 45) -t which tine there
were con^arativoly few members of the Gorman police or security Units in

the countrj'", although as a result of sestis repeated re-'uosts to the Foreign

Office^, one battalion of police troops had been dispatched to Denmark during
spring or early suiiuaor of 1943^

(Tr. 26512)*

After this Danish Govern

mental crisis and the declaration of a state of omorgcncy by the German

Army which followed the incident on 25 August,, Best demanded additional

Germn police for Denmark,

The transfer of so many police to Denmark seemed

to imply the appointment of a Higher SS and police Leader therec

The For

eign Office^ in passing Best is demands on to the BBEIi, mentioned the

possible establishment of such a post* (Ex* 3625, NG—3974? Bk« 9S—A? ?• 75)»
Originally, Best vranted to occupy this position himself (t^'* 26545)? but
Ribbentrop crushed this ambition because he objected to Bostts simultaneously
holding two positions, each of i^ich would have required separate lines of
t

control*

(Tr* 26S45)-9

At this point STEEUGItXHT entered thq picture. He negotiated with Ernst
✓

'

Kcltenbrunner, the Chief of the RSHi'i? on the relationship between the Higher
SS and police Leader and the Foreign Office roprosonta,tivcs in Donrnark,^
*

Franco and the southeast. One such conference took place on November 7?

1943? when Kaltenbrunner came to the Foreign Office ancl had a conference

with STEEHGR:^CHTc (Ex, 3^14? HG-5036? Bk, 9^A? P. S)that, they
had agreed that a certain SS General, pancke, should bo appointed as the
Higher SS and Police Leader for Denmark, (Tr. ISIO6), As soon as pancko

took over, Best complained that he had received no^-vnr-itten confirmation that
to be

pancke was/subordinate to him,

'

(Ex. 3630? ^JG—5455? Bk* 9^*i? P®

rtoN

)•

STEEI'JGR.'EHT again acted as arbitrator, ancl quiclcLy arrived at a v^orking
solution with Kaltenbrunner,

(Ex, 3630? supra).

STBE^JGR/lGHT plciyGd a sinilar role with respect to Franco^

lhcre_, a

three-cornered jurisdictional dispute had arisen botvreen the various Gejy-

man police and security agencies subordinate to Kaltenbrunner, the military
✓

agencies subordinate to the Liilitary Commander West;, and those subordinate
to the German Foreign Office,

At that tirae iTinistor •schleier was the German

Minister in Franco, in lieu of the temporarily absent /jibassador Abotz,
STEEHGR-'.CHT interceded vath Kaltenbrunner and managed to find an acceptable

compromise which "protected the interests of the Foreign OfficGc"
✓

^

•

(For a

•

summary of this conference, see Ex«: 3^14^ suprae).

In September 1943. STEEICRi'iCHT went to Sofia, ostensibly for the pur

pose of attending the funeral of King Boris of Bulgarian

The documents

reveal, however, that the real purpose of his trip was far more significant
.*T

than this6

STEEI^GHXHT was concerned mth the state of King Boris' health

for some time, since it became knovm that the King v/as not too enthusiastic

abcut Germany.

(Ex, C-418, NG-100, Docn Bk» 205^ P> 4)<.

After the mysterious

death of King Boris, not long after his visit to Hitler, STESNGRjTHT went to
Sofia and remained there until the Gfibinet was regoncratcdt

And a new ccurso

of friendly policy toward Germr.ny was installed by the Regency Council (Exc_

C-^8, supra; EXn C-419, NG-O925 Doc. Bk. 205, P® 9? E:o, C-420, NG--116, Doc,
✓

•

Bk. 205, Po 19)0

Our purpose in mentioning these Uiroe incidents is limited for the
r

time beings

Their significance here is that they shovf conclusively STEM—

GR/iCHT^s importance and to what extent Ribbontrop relied on his judgment and
discretion-.

STE.EKGRj'iCIIT had been entrusted by Ribbentrop with "protecting the in
terests of the F.'reign Office against other agencies vdth ruthless cnergy"«

(Tr*o 9772)0 In the foreign affairs just mentioned ho managed to do exactly

that, also neither the agency with which he was dealing (RSHA) nor its Chief

(Kaltenbrunner) was the softest conceivable opponent© In his assignment in
•

✓

Sofia, in lieu of Ribbentrop, STEENGR;'iCHT proved himself as an effecti^re
state Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

-6-

:mm.

The nainstcy of STSEirTR/.CIIT' s dcfonso is thr.t ho was a ncro

courier or nail-distributor; that every decision of any inportanco

v/as nadc in Ribbcntrop's field hcr.dquartors; cJid that ho, 3TEMGR.XHT, has alnost no voice in shaping the course of events,. This
oxaggo^atod solf-disparagonent to noro clorksnips and nailaon is
a standard defense in Nurenborgj but it is hardly available to

•^1
S'I!E2ilIjGR...0iiT because it is contradicted by his ov^ tcstinony:
"Q,

Has it, for instance, possible for a dcpartnental
chief or Rofcront to make a decision indopon-'
dently, without having first trJJced to you
about it?

"k.

There is, and there wero, never any fixed
regulations in tho Foreign, Office as to v^iat
oja official could decide for hii^isv^lf and

what ho had to submit to his superiorTnat
is loft to the proper discretion of every
individual official, so theoretically^ it was

possible for the lowest official, that is,
, , '•

,,

tho lowest senior official, stoxting vdth the

''

rank of Senior Legation Secretary, to make
the most iiiiportant of decisions. That is

"thcoroticelly' possible.

ic,

4«i ^

"Q,

;jia it did actually hsppcn?

"k,

Xos, it happened under certain conditions,
and that v^as no infr.ingoij?.cnt of existing
regulations." (Tr, 97^*7).

In the course of 3'IEMGR;j.CHT' s activities dcscribod above,

ho acted on his own responsibility and handled tiic most delicate
political matters according to his Ovvn best judgment vdthout any
direction from any/ono. But his importance as chief of tho Gonuan

Foreign Office in Berlin since 1943 docs not end Ydth his ovai

personal accomplishiiicnts, more vath his position at tho head of
the Foreign Office hierarchy. His influence on Ribbcntrop is

perhaps even more significant. It has already been pointed out that
STEMGR.HIT v/as a pcrsonc^l protege of Ribbentrop. But tho flow
of ideas bctvrcon tho tvro men was not onesided. There is undisputed
tostiiaony that ST3mNGR,xCHT was a personal friend of Ribbcntxiop;
that thoy spent much tii^ic in each other's company; that Ribbcntrop

folt a unique

confidence in STEEKGliXHT' s ability^ loyalty and

discretion,, ajid that he i7as in a better position than anyono else
to exert a noticeable influence on Ribbentrop's decisions» He quote:
'-'.•,1 often used to undertake v^alks mth Ribbcntrop-..
It seemed to no that that moment vfas a favorable one,

Ribbontrop also being in a good franc of mind^ to dravj
his ^attention,.. ;jid here again I had to utilize his
mentoJ-ity,, to tell him that he would be able to jualcc
a groa.t name for himself and at the same time ho

vrould proba.bly earn the gratitude of Europe,, possibly-"

(Tr. 975G).
This statement shows STESNGR.CHT's great ability to handle
and influence Ribbcntrop at the right moment.
One of STEj2>IGRXHT's functions was to attend intordopartnental mef^tings bctvrcon the chiefs of various Roich ministries

and other important agonciesc lie did so in lieu of tho ilinister.

{Ej:h„ 4730, NG-1510, Bk. 91, p- 51).
R3.bbontrop's confidonco in STEEJIGRXHT is conclusively shown
'i

by tho fact that tlia.t he before being appointed to tho State Secre
taryship vvas the top liaison official between tho Foreign Ilinistor

"

V. \

and Hitler. The defendant's testii.iony on this point roads in part:
>0

".« Bcf03X) that date there wore tvjc or tlirco

• ik

incidents in v/hich Ribbcntrop -gave me a

i

special assignment, This consisted in my

ha^ving to go to Hitiler and I had to submit
ma.ttcrs to him which Ribbcntrop had drav.71
up and elaborated upon..." (Tr. 9754)*

BlEEiiGRRCHT, as State Secretary of tho Foreign Office had

important responsibilities in occupied and satellite countries;

^

I

Tho gonera3. position of tho Gojmian Foreign Office mth respect
to tho control and administration of occupied territories hp.s

boon described by the Intcrnatjjcnal Llilitary Tribunol.

-a-

'•'•J

"Von Ribbentrop is also responsible for •war crimes
and crimes against humanity because of his acti-

vitios with respect to occupied countries and
Axis satelliteso The top German official in both
Denmark and Vichy France was a foreign office
representative^ and von Ribbentrop is therefore
responsible for the general economic and political
policies put into"effect in the occupation of

those countriesooe"
Vole 1;,

(Trial of Jtajor rjar Criminals,

23?) o

The top German official in Donmark referred to by the TTT was
✓

•

the Reich Plenipotentiaiy, Werner Besto The official in VichSr-Fronco
✓

was Otto Abetz^ who held a double—barralled title as /jibassador to

the Vichy French Government^ and as political advisor to the German

Military Commander in France,,

This^ of course^ meant that Abetz

the politically most powerful figure in France during the occupa
tion*

The tasks and functions entrusted to Abetz and Best have been

described at some length in Exhibit C-^21, DoCo KrG~5515^ Bode 205,

Po 24/25; an affidavit by Eri.ch /JLbrecht., who v/as chief of the Lega:L
Division

of the German Foreign Officeo

Vfe quote?

"The tasks cf Abetz and Best, therefore^ ex
ceeded conslderablj- the usual'scope of tasks
of diplomatic I'epresentatives., nameiy_, to
negotiate vdth the receiving state and to re
port on the political., econcmtc, cultural and

other dorelopmentso

Abotz and Bost^- in their

^

agencies, were subordinated in roferoncc to

f'

their complete activitlesc to the Reich Foreign
Minister and the Foreign office^ As far as
member.3 of tho Foreign Office were authorized
to sigh instructions to tho German Missions

abroad, this authority v/as not restricted, as
far as'cho offices of Abetz and Best were con-

corned, to such matters which bel.ongcd to normal

^

business of diplomatic missions but comprised
all .ncctters which boD.onged to the task of both,

within the Foreign Office those matters of the

e^rbended^ as well as of tho normal business,
wore v.'orked 6n corrospdndj.ng to their character

as political; economi-c, legal or propaganda
matbor, etc^, by bhs competent divisions. Also,
so far as reports to the secretary of state and

('

i'

;

to the Minister were concerned, mat'' ors of the
'

extended scope of task were treated in the same
manner as those vdiich belonged to the usual diplo—

matic tasks.

The above is a description of the

normal course of business.

There were, natur

ally^ exceptional cases when Abetz or

-9-

f: .-

f ' .iVi

Best was rccoivcd porsona3JLy by Hitler^ roportod

to liixa, and rcccivod instructions from Ribbcntrop
directlywhile reporting in personc But aside
frora those cases which v/cro, on the vrholo^ excep
tions^ the course of business for ibctz end Best
vfas carried on through the usu:\l channels of the

Foreign Office^ ospocia-^-ly the State Secretary
•• was talcing part according to the usually adopted
procedure, ;.bctz and Best frequently made use of
the possibility to state in their reports that
they desired them to .bo submitted to the Reich
Foreign llnister,^

'11
•i

In the course of subsequent examination the witness aO-brecht

elaborated on the Foreign Office Staff v;ho were authorized to sign
' ' ' i'f'ii

i.A

instructions to Ibctz an Best, He stated,:

s
"Q. 1^0 v»cro the authorized persons to
sign instructions?

'M, The State Secrotaiy, the departjacntal chiefs
and their deputuosj senior legation and those
^counsellors or section chiefs "Referatsleitor"

who held a special g-^-ncral authority to do so."

(Tr, 26675).

SIEEilGRlCIiT vfas the immediate supervisor of /.botz and Best,

In i.ay 1944^ ho summoned Ibetz from Paris to Berlin^ for the pur
pose of upbraiding him for not having talcon reprisal measures agrinst

the French population for the shooting of Tunis fighters by members
of the French resistance movor.iont in North Ulrica. (E::di. 14Ej2^ NG-

3307, Bk, 50j p. C2), In July 1944^ STEilIGR.:CHT simimonod Best to
t

Berlin for a similar interview. I'fhon Best suggested "reprisal mur

.

ders", STE.uNGRlGiIT remarked a.pprovingly that ho "considered thcjii
useful",

IpJO, NG-.4eC0j Bk, 52, p. .27).

Since SliimGH._CHT vras the second highest official in Gorman

Foreign iffairs, ho had a tremendous power to do good or evil to the
millions of Inhabitants of GoiTaarL-occupiod torritorj'". In the folloTp•

ing chapters we vdll submit evidence stating that STEShGR,.JHT .used
his power for evil purposea and participated in the most outragous •
Uar Gririios .and Criines against HuriLanity.

-10-
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Grimes end ^Crimes against Humanity*.
A. ^fbangc •

!• Unlci-.vful i^rrests of ^'rench Kotionols .and ^cpbrtT.irl-dnS'
to Concentration Caiips in Gerzany.
'

.VJI

•\
In paragraph 42 of the Indictment, STi-EKGRhCKT is charged

nith the co-responsibility for the follov.i ng ^crimes:-

"In furtherance (Cf the Gerizin Reich's
program of 'pacification' of the occu
pied territories through terrorism, the

arrest, imprisonment, deportation and
murder of so-called host-'.^-^s
effected.

Jens, alleged Goi;imunists, 'asocials',
.and other innocent mc: bers of the civilian

population of^ the occupied countries net
connected a'^ith any act.s against the occu
pying poT.cr acre tcJcen as hostcges and,
nithout benefit of investigation or trial,

T;ere summarily deported, harged, or shot.

_.

These innocent victiiTis ucrc executed or

deported at- arbitrarily established
personnel in..the occupied territories.

'

In many cases the recoidncndation and
approval of the Gcrmn Foreign Cfficc,

^
•

HIIT'ES,
, and their repre
sentatives, v;as. required prior to the
execution of

these ixasures and the

neccssery diplonrtic 'cover-up' vras
• • ^
•

effected to conceal""the nature of these
erimes II

\

The' International Military Tpibun-.I stated concerning
ill-treatment cf civilian popul' tion:
"Murder andv ill-treatment of civilian

population';. •**rticlc 6 (b) 'of the
Charttlr provided th t 'ill-trea.'^blCJit
of civilian popul tion in occupied
territories,
killing of hostages...,
destructions of cities, toans or

'villages* shall be a aax crime. In
the i:r-in, these provisions r.x^ clearly
declaratory of the existing lav;s of
War as expressed by The Hague Conven

tion, .^irticle 4^» rhich stated:
'Famiily honor r.nd rights, the life of
persons and private property, as veil
as religious convictions and practice
must be respected.*
"Theterritoixes occupied by Germany
ncre administered in vi«l :tion of the
Laws of War.

The evidence is quite'

oveiiahelming of a system:-.tic rule of

violations, brutality and terror,"
(Vol.,. I, p. 232).
-
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j

raiios for attacks by person or .persons
imknorn on G6rma.n installations and Gqj.u2;:n

nith the pcrticipa.tion of the defendants
whiaS-^CICEP., STLEIGHXKT, BLHLE,

_ ' ' •'• j
,

(

"Even p&rsons v:ho Vv-ere only suspected of

opposing rny of the Gerrxin policies of
the Gernnn occupation authorities were
arrested and, on arrest were interro

gated hy the Gestapo and the SD in. the
most shameful manner,'

"The brutal suppression of nil oppositicn^
to the German occupation was not con
fined to severe pressure against suspected
members of resistance movements, but v^is ,

also extended to their families," ((Tryxa^rof,

V^ar Cr^aumlSj'^ol. I, p,-233)'
The IMT further found that the defend-Ht Ribbentrop was
*•

•

generally responsible for.war crimes and crimes agiinst hunBnitys
".•.becr.use

of his activity with respect

to occupied countries rnd -'^xis satellites.

The top "German official in.both Renmarkr
and Vichy-Rranco was a Foreign Office
representative and von Ribbentrop, there
fore, responsible for the general economic

and political policies put into e~ffect in
tte occupation of those countries,"(Tri^l

df-±he-]\feiiJ#r Wdj,Criminals, Vol, I, p» 287)«
The arrest and subsequent depcjrtation to GernBny of nany
thousards ©f French nationals were criminal for a variety c£
*

reasonsi

Theevidence demonstrates with clarity that French

civiliamd were arrested and incarcerated under flimsy pretextSf

either without any cause whatsoever or on some vague and general
suspicion,

*i.s the IMT held*

"In the administration of the occupied
territories the eoncentration camps

^ttrc used to destroy all opposition,.,"

|| '

,

.

(3^rial of_the_]V^£r_i»ar_CriininaXsj^ Vol. I,P'234^ .

Furthermore, the deportation to Germany of civilian,

popialations in occupied territcsrics constitutes per se a sericxiS/

international crime.

Thus,, the Tribunal of U#_S_.' vs.

cJi»

al, stated that deportation v;i-.s illegal "r/here pepple ore. de
ported from a country ©eeupied by the invader while the o«ecup ied enemy still has an army In the field and is still
resisting,"

. . .
I

Another condition under which deportation becoiiES illegal.
I

'

occurs, according to the same opinion "v;henever generally

-•£2-

• /n

recognized standards of decency and humnity are disregarded.

This flows from the established princi-plo of law that an other
wise permissible act becomes a crime "hen carried out.in a
criminal maimier.'^

Both rules automatically stamp as criminal

the deportation to C^ermany of thousands of ^'rcnchmen for vihich

STM^BRiiCHT is hpld co-responsible.
•The top Gcrnr.n official in Vichy, Branca, was, arothe IMT
foreign Sffice representative t©->-lt
stated, "Che / ' the Geiman -imbassadqr to Brance,. Otto -w-betz
and during his absence from Franco his deputy, Schleier.

The

IMT f indir^ in this respect is fully borne out by the evidence
in the instant case which refutes the rationalization of

STLEM}R-I3HC and hxs witnesses •^'^betz and Schlcier who, themselves

J

participants in/the same crimes with which STEENGRitCHT is

charged, would make this tribunal believe that the duties cf the

Foreign Office representative were limited to the usual
.

'

diplomatic functions.

The evidence establishes that ^^-betz was

tiie nE.n on'the spot in charge of the planning, direction and

coordination of Germany's criminal policies in France, which
' t :li

were implemented in cooperation and with the assistance of th&

SD and cf thc^ Gorman IVh-litary iidministrat'ion. For a correct
%

understanding of Jibetz* position and tasks it in5y be wel2 to
recall that Vichy, France, was a puppet state with a Mode-

h

Government v'hich was

expected to reach agreements an,

controversial questions by way cf negotiations, but simply to

accept ani obey Abetz' ©rders without discussion and to carry -

them out without delay,

tfhcn .^ibetz was appointed "German

itmbassador" to "Sic Viohy Government, he was given tte clear
I

assignment of eon trolling the French Government and conp.c.Uing

it to comply with German demands. (Fxh. I686, Docuanent 3614-1^,
Doc. Book 60-B, p. 111).

*

Two more exampl>.s will suffice to clarify this beyond ^
all doubt.

On 6 December 1945. Hibbentrop instructed -betz
•r
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•

as follows««. the three demands Soated in the letter of the Reich

foreign Minister to "the B/fershal ( Retain ) of 29 •Kovemher, tiB accep
tance of which demands — as stated explicitly in the letter— are the^

prer0(3_uisites for filrther collaboration with the Rrench ^ovemnBnt*
Therefore, the Reich G-overnrcent expects the Marshal to fctrward an

- •.

imKBdiate ( sans delai ) and unrestricted acceptance — without any
reservations —> cf the three deuBi^s in*'q.uestion

you make this demarche verbally

I reg.uest that

•'e consider it absolutely seljf —
/

evident that'the-Marshal accept these demands without any hesitation
\

since, as the letter states clearly enopgh, if he does not accept

and fulfill these demands, we shall bl^ie him. for the cbnseg.uences#"
I

( ^-xh,

KG-5211» Doc. Book 209, P-3o)\

/

Another instruction of Ribbentrop req,iBSted Abetz to "l) to. send
Mr, Laval a list of those persons in the ^rench cabinet and those
key government officials whose dismissal from office must be

•

denmnded, 2) to give a further li.st of names of those persons

-^
^

holding positions of authority in the administration, etc, who

''I

must ianedi-ately be replaced by reliable persons, j)

,

V''

req.uest ^

Mr. Xaval to confirm in writing to the ^m^assy thai?__the French
I

*

^

'

Government has. adopted the necessary hieasures to insure that all
indicated amendments are in future submitted to the Reich Govern

ment for prior approval," (-Bxh.

3211, ^oc.Rook 209»P*42)»

Only four high officials of tte Bcreign Offi9e received copies of

this very impcartant letter:" STEttNGJbiCHr, Rencke, Rrdmannsdcrff, and
Renthe-Rinko

^betz' evil influence upon the destiny of Prance was of course

not entirely of his ovfn making and of his own volition. He was
under the direct supervxsion of the Pcreign Office and there the
man in

cliarge of the formulation and direction of the policies for

France vjas, next to Ribbentrop, &rkBI'^GR*'iCHrb

-
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STEENGRi'iCHT ttqs kept continuously infonaed by reports •

from the Gernr;n i-mbassy in Paris on reprisal KEasijres against the
<!

civilirji population in Prance, and, far from exercising a

moderating influence, he backE'd them up and actively partici—
N 'I

p£:-.ted in their final formulation end implementation.

Ji report from the hmbassy in Paris, signed by Schleier, a.nd
2.-f

dated 29 M?.y' 1^3, "hich v;as received by

.

(as sealed

matter) nrd distributed by him to other divisions, , reveals that

v'

subsequent to the flight of General Georges, a representative of

the Embassy in Paris told Xaval and other high ^eruun officials
"that the Government would finally have to take, severe measures ^
\

against the foLiilies of Prenchcen who had joined the-resistance
and lock them into concentration campsV since the-measures

connected '>7ith deprivation of citizenship were only of a.
/

material, nature and did not have an intimidating effect**} he
furtter remarked that the German police would soon have to take
more severe measures,if the French police fr>iled to do so

(Exh<36l6,I^-5l37(l;;i Docp Bk. 98-j'i.. p.-l4)e -*few hours later,
Schleier repcortsd to STEEWGRtaGHT—who ma.de the customary dis
tribution of this report to the-sections concerned in th^

4
I •

%

Porcign Office—on a conference with the Chief of the Securi"i:y
Police and SD, Knochen, ccnceming the reinforceeient in ;per-

spnnel and weapons requested by the Vichy Police **for sp<;cial

tasks", and on the necessity to'exercise increased pressTure
, ->1

on Laval io induce him to' tc.ke "stricter measures agains't

'A

faimly members of the persons who had joined the dissidents".
V S

(Exh. 36i6t
'5^37f
p. 16-^) On 4 Tune 191^3,- the CeroT-n top-ranking civil and miLitary
officials in Prance met in a conference which waspresided ever

by Schleier (Exh. 361?. WG-5130, -Ooc, Book 98-^» P* ^7)Gqneral agreement was reached to arrest vjell-known Prench
^ 15,

V

.

•s<i
!

•

officers (lbid» p, I9), ard to initiate siinilcr measures, as

qulckl;^ as possible, against relatives of vjell lai©v.'ii personalities
v;ho had joined the resistance i]ir?vement ♦

The transfer of such

• persons,;to areas •which vjere particularly endangered by air raids

was equally conteirplated (ibid# p* 25)-

On 6 June 19^5^
t

Deputy Comnahder-in-Chief '«est suggested to the CK>»j in agree

ment with the Gernnny Embassy in Paris ard the O^nEmnder of the
Security Police and cf the SD the arrest and deportation ©f

high-rankirg French army and air force officers aid cf 'the
familites of suspicious jersons who have already been won over

to dissidiag groups or will do so in future..#" (^xh, 1477t
FJl-2430, Doc'# Book 5® I P- 45)*

In December 1943? ^ confer ncc took place in the foreign
Office in Berlin "on the measures to be taken in France".

The

leading cdnspiratcrs includiig Ribbentrop, STFEFGRi'iGHr, -^ibetz,
Ifedtenbrunner, ard others attended..

They decided to arrest
.r'vl

2,000 prominent Frenchmen who did not collaborate •with

the

C-ormns ard who might constitute an element dangerous to the
Gernr.n forces,

i^bassador -ibetz was asked to take up this
/.

matter immediately and to compile lists of suitable persons*.
STEEDGR*j.CHT supplied the following informr.tion with respect
/-

to'this conference:

"^#..1 can only be included in this affair

because I took part in this one meeting when it was stated

that 2,000 people should be arrested" (Tr, p. 9938-

pp. 9948 to 9950)^

also

, '

On 15 December 1S43» •'ibetz inforixd the ^'oreign Office
(the repcrt was again received by GTEEWjxbiCHT as a sealed
matter) that the SD had conpleted lists of 15O0 persons who
were tc be arrested in France? I03 of whom held important
♦ iSee BflT Transcript No. ^953-^954» Ribbentrop's cross-exami
nation, Doc. Book
, p. 49t .which we ask the Tribunal to

' take judicial notc'oi'.
\
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positions in the vnciniinistrr.tive, pSilitlcel, econoirio, ond
cultural spheres 0

Unanimous agreenent "C7a£.^~ched betT^een the

Embassy and the military commanders Trith respect to 67 persons
on this list (Exh# 3^4^! N^-3211; Doc, ^^ook 209, po 33)♦
Seme of the reasons given in -*betz' report for the planned

arrests read cs followss

"Opposed to the Reich", "hates the

GerxTians", "helped J"ev;s to safeguard their property", etc.
(Ibid,, pp. 34-38),

revised and^ amplified list contrinirjg

a representative cross-section of i'renchmen in influential

positions, vas submitted by -*bctz to the Foreign Office at the
beginning of January 1944» vJith the canment. that the persons narked
for preventive arrest "had not been guilty of a proved crime
but there are only suspicirns a£ a general mture against "ttiem.
Immediate arrest has clvays been carried out vrhen concrete

elements of suspicion, even of a miner character, existed.

In

1943 alone 34,97? persons ^ere arrested by the Gernr.n police
and 91^7

French police for Gaullist, B/Iarxist and anti-

German activities,",

(Exh. 3^18, lJl-3i94» Doc, Book 98—*1 P* 4l)«

In response to e. Foreign Office inquiry ®f 18 February

1944, (Exh. 1479, 1nG-4«6g, Doc, Book 5'5, p.5l)» **t)ctz submitted^
on 23 February a telegraphic report (sealed mrtter) which
proves tha.t the operation was in full swing at that ticK: and
thr.t large-scale arrests were being conducted, all based on

the lists as'they had been previously elaborated (ibid., p, 52)«
number of Government officials, writers, niKi a university

director wore arrested on "substantial suspicion" (ibid, p, 52).
The report continues tp sayt

"i^fter the above-iiK;ntioncd lists had been

compiled and independently from them tshe
Embassy hr.s received iirf'crraa.tion abou*
notoriously dissenting nativities by
I•

leading officials c.r& has immediately

. '•

;^rdered iheir

mil
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"Persons arrested on

grounds are being

-colloctod in the detention cw:ap Go^Jpicgno, and
are being at the earliest opportunity deported
to Gci-nanyo This V7ay during the laso vjccks .alone
1700 prisoners have been transferred to concen
tration ca^ps in the Roichu On the politically
prondjicnt personaJLitios anong those prisoners, a

follow.." (ibid, p, 53)„
The report concludes with the statement that "the total nura-

ber of arrests by gcrxuans is at present on an average of 4«0C0 per

month" (Ibid» p, 54)« Some days l.ator i\hotz forwarded to the Foreign
Office a list describing 50? out of the total of Frcnclimon liithcrto,
arrested and- dcporti^d to Germanyj as being of special "political
significance". He a.ddcd that "A now transport of I5OO prisoners
4

v/ill leave France for Germany next week. All in all 23-000 French
police prisoners have been sent to tho Reich up to now," (ibid-paVl).
In a report from division Inland II to Section Pol II - both

•of vdiich vras subordinated to STEFaJGRACHT - it was stated on 14

feirch 1944 that accotrlng to information from the Chief of tho Se
curity Police and the SD. ".The majority of the prisoners arrested

In France and sliippod to Gormo.ny -rill^ :in view of their anti-German
attitude (for inetance_, resistance movcnKnt) bo interned in ordinmy
concentration cojri<3s^" and that only prominent personalities vrould

4

be transferred to special camps. (Ibid, p, 72).
In this crescendo of arbitrariness and terror^ the number of

Fri^nch arrestoo? and deportees had by 22 llarch reached 22,00bj as
it appears from a memorandum submitted by tho head of tho Legal. De
partment of the Foreign Office to his superior^ •STEICtJGrLXHT (ibdi.

, 361S^ NG-5a94^ Doc.Bk, 9£J"A^ P^Vi-). Finally a memorandum bearing
3TEM^GR;XHT's signature notes on 23 iiay 1944 that according to
.tb-^tz' in.formation 50-»000 P''rGnch people had boon arrested and trans

ferred to 3D Camps in Gorruanyj in addition to a groat number of
proaiinont personalities who wjto also taken in protoctivo custody
(Sxh, 1482j NG-33G7j DoCo Book 50., p. 82).

This is, in short, the story of the conspicuous part played

by the Pcreigii Office aid STEENGRACKT in the schenB of intiniidation

ajd Jswlessness against the ^'dench people.

STFtJJGRACHT seeks refuge

behind excuses dii ch represent a mixture of evasiTe doiitle talk and

fantastic statements which are in hopeless conflict with tie clearly

incriminating evidence of the Prosecution,

Today he chooses to

concoct a fable that he ard his colleagues were exoaiples of righteous
ness and that they used subterfuge and fake rgj orts to counteract

tie

harsh measures of their boss, Ribbentrop.

Yet the evidence.

Conclusively proves that he was Ribbentrop^s closest collabcsrator
aid most tilling servant,

Rcr s^me reasons, mysterious and unknown,

he claims that he participated in "this affair" only until 18

February 1944

995^)-

proof, however, leaves no doubt that

he was intimately connected with the program of mass arrests and
deportations of Frenchmen ever since he became State Secretary

until the abrupt end of his career whi ch vas coincidental with the
downfall of the Third Rei eh.

By EEons of soiie mathematical thauma-

turgy he attempts to conjure aw^y the staggering extent of depcrta-

tions listed in reports which were received by hio and in rcenaranda

which were signed by him. He repeatedly chorused that he actually
had no share in then.

X.

Yet tte evidence establishess beyond doibt

that the arrests ard deportations were carried cut ;lth ruthless
w

deternimtion pursuant to a carefully planned and prepared scheme
iniie formulation and execution of which STEENGR/ICHT had an
instruirental part,

submit that the Defendant STEENGR/VGHT is gu-ilty as charged
under this count of the indictment.

X:
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Murder of Frenchmen under the Pretext of Reprisal

Measures♦

iis time V7ent oni the Ifezi occupants no longer coisidered

mass arrests and deportations to German concentration camps of
innocent or sispeoted Frenchmen as sufficient deterrent#

The

spread cf intimidation and terror through governmentally c3irected
aid planned murder became the deTice which the German Foreign

Office aid their associates thought fit for the attainment of the

"pacificaUon" of France#

It goes without s^ing tint Ribbentrop

aid his diplomats were anxious to fabricate some legal cloak which

was to camoiaflage their murderous design.

The gentlemen of the

Foreign Office viio displayed a callous disregard for human life,

as long as it was that dT a frenchman, of a Dutchman, or ,of another

4
member of a nation under Nazi obninc.tion, regcded the execution of

Frenchmen who had fought against de Gaille's forces as convenient
and suitable reason to order the murder of other Frenchmen "in

reprisal."

Again we find STEEl^iCET and his appointee and

protege Abetz together nth their acccanplices from the SD and
Military rf'idmini strati on as zealous and informed participants in
this scheme of murder.

The IMP found that«

"... the practice cf keeping hostages

to prevent and to punish any form of civil disorder was :iresorted
to by the Germansj ... the exact number of persons killed as a
result of this policy is not known, but large numbers were killed

in France ard the other occupied territories in the Vilest.

(Trial

of the Iifejor War Qriminals, Vol. 1, p. 234)

^ recent judi cial finding in Nurnberg expressed the _following
opinion concerning the taking and killing of hostagesi

"in the Southeast Case, United States vs. ^'ilhelm last,
et al, (Ca&e No. 7), the 'tribunal had occasion, to con
sider at considerable length the law relating "to hostages
and reprisals.

It was therein held that under, certain

very restrictive conditions ard subject to ceri^ain rather
a?/!

extensive safeguards, hostages my be taken, and after
a judicial find.ng of strict compliance with all preoonditions and as a last desperate remedy hostages may
even be sentenced to death. It was held further liiflt

similar drastic eafegunrde, restrictions, and Judicial

- 'to-

-c'

i

^

_ 1.,

pre-ocmditiors apply to so-called "reprisal prisoners."
If so inhumane a measire as tte killiEg of innocent
persons for offenses of "others, even -j^iEn drastically
safeguarded and limited, is ever jermissibJe under any

. •

theory of international lav, killing ri thout full
compliance with all requirements woiid be murder®

'a

If

killing is not permissible under any circumstances, tten
a killing with full compliance with all the mentioned
prerequisites s t i l l would be murder.

In the case here pesehted, we find it unnecessary
to approve or disapprove the conclusions of lav announced
in said j\idgment as to the permissibility of such killings.

In the instances of so-called hostage taking and killing,
and the so-caUed reprisal killings vith which ve have to
deal in this case, the safeguards and pre-conditions

required to be observed by the Southeast Judgment were not
even attempted to be met or even suggested as necessaryo

Killings without full compliance with such pre-conditions
are merely teiTor murders.

If tie lav is in fact that

hostage and reprisal killings are never permissible at all.,
then also the so-called hostage and reprisal killings in

this case are merely terror murders."
leeb et al. Judgment, p, 92/93*)
We believe that this

constitutes a

(US vs. *^ilhelm von

well considered £^nd correct

statenent cf the Igal position.

'*e went into the foregoiig brief recital of law pertaining to
the killing of hostages only to demonstrate hew flagrantly the pro

visions of International I/iw were violated by these dipjomats who
ought to have known them better than any other German, an<d how

ridiculous STEEHJRi'.GHT*s contention is that such reprisal, actions

were permissible (tr. 10072).
to poirt

It wL 11 be sufficient for

our purpose

to the clear language of the document in crder t'O prove

beyond doubt that ihe pincipal oonspiratcrSjRibbentrop, STEENGRiiCHT
ard iibetz, being thoroughly aware of the criminality of tlie enter

prise, attempted to' justify their acts with saae pseudo-i.egalistio
semblance.

, k. •••I

Moreoever, it is stressed that STEEICRjlGBT ar-d his

partners had no subiness whatsoever to qause innocent Krenchme-n to
be murdered in so-called reprisals for the execution cf French

traitors (so-called Tunis-Kighters) who had been sentenced to death
by Krenoh tribunals in North -irfrica.

-
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On 6 April 1944 "bhe Oerman Emtasdy In Paris for^'/arded to
the German Foreign Office a report designated as "Execution of
veterans of the T'unis can^jaign — counter operation'* -• which vras

received? as were all sealed matters; "by STEE^"^GPACHT (Exo 1526;,

lTG-4949, DoCo Bkv l) and distributed by him to the departments
concerned for further handling of the matter,,

Here it is stated^

in part; as follows?

"Another conference with Grupponfuchrer OBERG showed
the following! 1») Prominent persons arrested for
dissident views, connections or acts and suitable

for

reprisals are without exception held within

Germany^

The Higher SS and Police Leader in France

is no longer responsible for these persons*: People
in our crastody here have no rea], importancOy

The

announcement of their ^ecial treatment as a reprisal
for the execution of'the sentences pronounced in

Algiers-; will not deter the Committee in Algiers
from instituting proceedings and executing the sentencesp

Grupponfuchrer OBEHG has thoreforo s^rggOGted

that the Foreign Office should request the Reich
Gecurity Main Gifico to furnish a list uf names and

tiint the matte*- be immediately dealt v/ith in Berlin^"

(Ex, 1481, 110-2595; DoCc

page 78«)'

It was further added that SS Obergruppeufuehrer OBERGy the

H3,gher GS and Police Loader In France, "promised to supply as
soon as pOrislble a list of prominent Frenchmen suspect of
/. ..

V*

anti—German'foelingc and connections with de Gaulllst

elements whose arrest as a reprisal for the Algiers sentences
mighb be con3.ldered..,"(Ex. 1481, irG-S595, Doc.Bk,50,page 79),
Q,uAc.k action followed to ppit this blue print into effect.

On .-lay 13; .194-1^ STEH5TGRACST recei-vcd another report from Abetz
sua-c-yng tnat fjve Fronc?imeii were executed on 4 I^ay in reprisal

for the execution of a Frenchaian In Nbrth Africa^ subsequent to
the passing of a death sentence by a court in territory under

de Gaulle's control,The report goes on to say that the five
executed Frenchmen "were not found carrying arms and woul'd nbb

have been shot ri^t away, but by their presence on the
Plateau de Gllerefs heve proved gu.fflcieiitly that they were
in connection wibh the rebels" (Ex^ 1480, ITG— 3065, Boc«

Bk. 50, pr.74) and there after Abotz
"

suggested to his bosses
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STEEI^GRfcUZHT and Ribbentrop the following expedient ani effective
solution:

"3 »)

The only really effective reprisal measure

wouM be the execution of influential dissident

leaders and cf such T'rench persorelities in whom
the Jews, Gaullists and Oommunists in Ucrth Africa
are interested. Such personalities are at present
not in the innds of the French Government.
I therefcre tahe the liberty to refer to my

prcrposal contained in my wire 1897 oT 2? April, to
shoot, as reprisal measures for tte execution of

Uunis-Fighters, ^'rench dissident personalities
responsible for the outbreak of the war, who are
in the hands of the Germans, beginnir^ vrith ieon

BLUM, Paul REfmUI) and Georges MINDLL," (Ibid. p.75)
The same Abetz who testified as a

defense witness for

SEEEIGR/iCUr that he never had official contact ^Tith Darnand, the

Chief of tie Yichy Police (Tr, IO813), declared in the abovementioned report«

"Today I toLhed over the Thole question with Parnand,
and yesterday with Saint-Martin, the politic^ lader

of the Tunis-Pighter-Legion, in Tunis, who is mostly
interested in the reprisal reasures and a totcal agree

ment was reached between Darnand, Guilband and Saint•i%rtin regai'dng the present and fui"ure hondilirg of
this question. (Ibid p, 74)

On 5/feiy 1944 ^^ibbcntrop directed STEEIC-PACHT to diswuss with
Abetz in a conference tie question of reprisal for the ex-ecution of
so-called Tunis Fighters (Defense Doc. Book lY

STnEMGR^^j-OHT

No. 96). A memorandim which was submitted to STEuENGBACffiT ifor this
purpose clearly reveals that the execution cf the five Frenol3r.en

in reprisal for the execution ofTunis Fighters hadnot besen initiated
by laval, but on direct orders of the Geman Foreign Office^ iVbrcover,
Rlbbentrop instructed iSTEENGR/iGHT to Impress on .^i-betz Ihcat it was not

desirable just to shoot in reprisal Frenchmen who were packed up at

random, but preferably prominert resistance leaders, Rllbbentrop's
briefing cf GTESNxRiiCHT concludes as follows:
"As far as AmbassQ±)r Abetz' repeated sugges-tion is
concerned, which proposed shooting personalilcies ^o
had been brought to Germny such as Leon BLUI/I, Paul
REYNiiUD and Ceorges MiilDEL as a r^risal measure for

the execution of ths Tmis-Eighters, the Peich Foreign
Minister takes the point of view that the reprisals in

this case have to emanate from the French Government
and must be focused on dissident leaders in France.
i'

t

u.
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nJhe Seicb. foreign Minister considers it an
important task of Ambassador Abetz to find such

persons and

in duce Layal to shoot them."
(Ibid, pp. 5V~58)

A memorandum, c^npiled by STEENG-RACHT, on his conference with
Abetz, dated 23 May 1944, discloses the results of their discussion.

STESNGIlilCHl himself aptly designated this document as a "ghastly
report" (Tr. 10076) and he did by no means indulge in an undorstatement in this charaoterization.. At first, STSBNGRji-GHT and Abetz looked

back to things so far achisTed;

«-

"50,000 rrenchmeneither suspected or accused
of dissident intrigues had been arrested and
transferred to the custody of the Security

Service (SD)."
(Ex, 1482, HG—3307, Bk, 53, p. 83.) The next item on the agenda
was the scheme of reprisal killings of Erenchmen, Abetz remarked
that, owing to the largo'-scalo arrests, n® prominent dissident

loaders wore at largo in France and available for. execution. Ho
went on to say that "of course the SD c"uld hand ovor notable

porsonagos to the French (Jovernmont without any difficulty, and
those persons could bo shot by way of reprisal. Hov;evor, those

persons v;ould' then be out of ilcrman hands." (Ibid).
STSEiTOEACHT did not seem to attach too much importance to

such technicalities, and disagreed with his subordinate, "I nolntod
out that it was not important where the -poonlo came from, but who
oxocutod thorn.
*

Thov.had to be executed oxclusively by the French

authoritioG." (Ibid),
Other -ooints of interest discussed betv/oon STESiTG-H-iCHT and
Abotz worcj

". . . among th'o men in honorable custody, BLITM,
iiiiTBEL, and RSYHAUD v.'ore most prominent. It v/as only
on this account that he ha.d racntionod their namos.

Should there not be any other privileged prisnnors
either, /ambassador /iBBTZ SToggostcd shooting irEOEBj,
OK.;L\rER01? ar\d some of the ..remainir^? wiro-pullors

of the Siipnr-Kap organization immediately aftor

interrogation, and to koop others in reserve, by
v;ay of reprisals, as the Algiers Committee might
hove a personal interost in them."
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"

17 ^y Ambassador Abetz told Gruppenf uehrer
Oberg and Standartenfuehrer I^nochen that the
Foreign Office approved of the intention of
the Reich Security ^fein Office to transfer
Guy la Ghambre and Jacomet to the ^^eich

(ibid p.83) •
After receiving STiEKGIWCitl''s conference report expressing the
idea that it irade no difference whether the reprisal hostages were

taken from G-erman concentration camps or from France proper, if only
they were executed by French authorities. Ribbentrop proved to be so
responsive to STi;M^R**CKr's proposal that he proposed it to Hitler
who agreed

" ,,, to have the French Governnent shoot the former

French ministers leon Blum, Ggorges Mandel and
Paul Reynaud after the next execution of a
veteran of the Timesian campaign* Hotever, the
Fuehrer said, care should be taken that tlie French
Government should not set them at liberty after they
have been arrested,"

( %h, l/).83i Mj- 3o6g, Doc.^ook50t P»85).
Mandel, who was a prisoner in a Ggrrnan concentration camp
and could not have had the remotest connection with the

execution of Tunis-fighters in North -Africa was subse

quently murdered* ( Tr, 10778)* V^e submit thr.t STKBl-^Ri^CHT
is an accessory in this and other reprisal miirders.
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B,

DENMARK

In order to give a comprehensible narrative cf the crimes in
Denmark ivith which STEEfJGfh^GHT is connected, it is necessary to

devote a little space to what took place there before he actually
began to take a hand in shaping events.

In November, 19U2, Vverner Best was appointed Reich Plenipoten
tiary in Denmark^

Ke succeeded ^tlittster R-mthe-I^nk who had had the

title of Plenipotentiary to the Danish Government since the German

occupation began.

The change in titles was not accidental.

Up until

the time' that Best was appointed, although.there had been some infringe
ments made upon the sovereigntj'" of the Danish Nation, a Govemmont did,
f

in fact, exist, and to some extent formulated its own policy, relatively
free from German interference. There was even a Danish Army in existence,
Hitler became dissatisfied with this state of affairs and decided that •

a "strong man" representing the German Government was needed in Dei?iiiarkj
and, as a corrcllary,tha5; the independence of the Danish Government
should be severely curtailed.

Ribbentrop.

.

This was discussed between Hitler and

Ribbontrop suggested Best -is the roan qualified to bring

about the changes which Hitler wanted.
In fact.

Until June of 19U2, Best had been a high Gestapo official, / he had
been one of the organizers of the Gestapo.

He remined in the RSHi

until I9I1O, when he was transferred to the Jitlitary Administration of
occuoied Prance.

He had had no ejq^orience wliatever in diplomacy or in

foreign affaii^, Ribbentrop arrangcid for him to be transferred to
the Foreign Office in June, 19U2. (Tr, 26791-2) The pwose of thiswas simply to allow Best the opportunity of familiarizing himself to

some extent with iiie Foreign Office, its protocol, procedure, and
organizational peculiarities. Though Best was not originally selected

specifically for the position in Denmark, some knowledge of Foreign
Office procedure was necessary for the position of'Reich Plenipotentiary

.V
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for Denmark, because that official was subordinate to the Foreign
Office and made his reports to and received his instructions from

the Wilhelmstrasse. Von Stutterhei^ of tie Re^ch Chancellery explained
Best's position as fo!^lovrs:

"He "vns "nractically therefore a kind of Reich

Commissar in Denmark, even if, contrary to the
Reich Commissars in Norway and the Netherlands,^

he possessed no right of authority over the Danish
agencies» He was further distinguished from the

Reich Commissars in Norvoy and the Netherlands by
the fact that he was not directly subordinate to

the Fuehrer, but was responsible to the Foreign

Office."

(Ex. 513, NG-3193, Book 36, pp. hS-h^)

On November h, 19ii2, his bri(.'f apprenticeship-at the Foreign Office
having b.een coirroleted. Best went to Copenhagen. (Steengracht Ex. 23>
STEENGR/iGHT Bk. Ill, p. I6)

Within a week he was well on his way

toward making the changes which Hitler and Ribbentrop had indicated.
The Danish Cabinet had radically changed - so radically, in fact, that
Best was able to report vath satisfaction that about one-half of the
Danish Cabinet Ministers were pro-German, and that the others were

amenable to control, either because of bad conscience or because of a

fear that they would lose their jobs. (Ex, C-79, NG-5827^ Book 209^ P» 12)
Apparently, however, the change in the cabinet personnel did not
complotely pacify the country.

By April, Best was sending requests to

the Foreign Office for additional German Police in Dermurk. (Ex, lU96,
NG-U562, Book 52)

In A^ay, the defendant STEENGRi'vCHT became a State

Secretary, and as such had the function of acting as intermediary
between Best and the RSHA.

As a result of the efforts of Inland II,

a department of the Foreign Office subordinated to STEENGRACHT> Best
received ii5 Gestapo officials in addition to a battalion of police

troops.

(Ex. 1^96, NG-U562, Book 52; Tr, 26812)

At the time that STEMGRACHT obtained these police forces for

Best, he had every reason for knowing the probable purposes for which
they would be used.

The functions of the Geslapo were no secret to him.

In fact, STEENGRACHT testified that he received information about" the
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mistreatmsnt of concentration camp inumtes from two different sources;
from foreign press notices as vfell as from foreign diplomats^ and also

from Germans who had been victims of the system* (Tr, 9872/3)

By dispatching

these uniformed SS butchers into Denmark," vfe submit that Stecngracht
s

^

made hiiiself a party to what happened after they got there.

On August

29, 19U3^ STEENGRACHT received a message from Best saying that his own
police, with the help of the troops, "arrested a sizable number of
persons" who were described as:

'

"potential supporters of resistance tendencies, (vri.thout
having actually ongagod in such activities, otherwise
they would have boon arrested earlier.

The arrest of anti-

German persons for the purpose of intimidation, continues."

(Bbc, 3622, NG-?16I|, Book 96-A, p. 56)
On September 1, SIEEfJEflACHT opened another sealed message from Best,
which read;

"Today, I took over the former Danish camp for Communists

in Horseroed, in order to utilize it as a conccintration
camp. The Wehrmacht guard will be replaced by a guard

*

from my police battalion. m(3x:. 3626, NG-5103, Book 98~A,
p« 68)

To all this, STEENGRACHT had no comment.
by Best in this way:
"Q

His attitude was characterized

After all, as you have stated, your relationship with Hfr,
Stecngracht was extremely cordial, so I believe there was
hardly any friction between you during the whole ti'ic you
spent in Denmark?

"A No, I never had any reason to object to any of his actions
with the lanistor
" (Tr. 26819-20)
*

"Q

In other wcrds, viiGnever you cane to Berlin to see Steongracht, you found out, or you noticed, that he was well

informed about what you were doing up hero?

A

In general, ho know abcut my activity,b ut sometimes in a
few cases,' it happened that he told mo that he did hot
know yet about this or that.

IWv

Q

Of course, no secrets could exist between two good friends
like yo.u and Steengracht?

I do not remember anything that I would havo kept a secret

as far as he was concerned."

-

(Tr. 26823 - 2682I4)

This harmony of spirit which existed between Best and STEErTGRA.CHT

contir^ues to be exhibited throughout the evidence,

testified to this effect (Tr, 1011i9j ^l)tak-e issue mth

STEECJGRACHT hir.'self

Npt once did $THEtJGRACI^

of the outrageous policies and measure^ which Best

reported to him as fast as they were conceived.

The oft-mentioned incident at Odense concerning the alleged "mis

treatment" of a Gorman officer took place on 2^ August 19li3. (3x. 3^19,
NG-5106, Book 98-A, p. U5).

as a result of this occurrence hi^e collec

tive fines were imposed uponthe inhabitants of the town where the event

took place, a military state of emergency was proclaimed throughout the
entire country, the Danish Government was forced to resign, -nd the
Danish Armed Forces wert dissolved and arrested. (Fx. 3619, NG-5l06j Book

98^ page

Sc. 3622, NG-5l8h, Book 98Apago 5U; 3x. 3623, NG-5189, Book

96^ page 58).

During the military state of emergency. Best made two new sug
gestions.

The first was the establishment of a new order in Denmark

( Axh."^62ij. J^G-5102 Doc .•'^ook 96 •''>'»P-6l)

which vfould abolish all vestiges of iTanish sovereignty,/and the second

was the deportation of all Danish Jews, (Sx. I669, Book 6O-B, page li).
The telegram in which the proposal to deport Jews was contained
came into the Foreign Office on September 8th and was passed on by
Steengracht to Ribbentrop without comment. (Ex. I669, supra)

Also as

a result of the Odense incident. Best renewed his demands for an increase

in the German police personnel in Denmark,

(Ex, 3628, NG-397U, Book 98-A,

i

p. 73)•

7/e have already mentioned that it was STEENGRACHT vdio conferred

with Kaltenbrunner concerning the choice of a Highor-SS and Police Leader
for Denmark, which th^i transfer of so many SD porsonncl required, and
that it was as a result of further conferences between Steengracht and

the RSHa chief, that the relationship of the Higher-SS and Police Leader
to Best was definitely established. (Ex. 36lU, NG-5036, Bk.-98-A, p. 8;

Ex. 3630, NG-5ii55, Bk. 98-A, p. 80) Thereafter, Best informed STEEN-^
GRACHT (sealed matter telegram) that PancJce^s cooperation with him was
.1 •»
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excellent. (Sx. C-62, NC—58ll, Book 209,

I63).

At the same time that these Kaltenbrtganer-Steengracht conferences

were taking place, the first acts of what later came to be known as the
counter—terror program took place.

T>fl.ldner, the Chief of the SIPO and

SD for Denmark, reported, under the code phrase t'Gernmn interests not

in'volved" through Best and the Foreign Office channels to the RSHA that
his men had taken ruthless action as a reprisal against the dynamiting

of German installations by unknown persons - (presumably)members of the

resistance movement group. (Ex. Ii23 j NG-5818, Book 205, p» 29). The
code was a common expression used by the Gestapo for German terror acts.
(Ex. 3632, NG-51iU9, Bobk 93-A, p. 105.)
The most significant conference concerning the counter-terror
1943

program was held on December 30th^ ^^t the Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Hitler,

Himmler, Kaltenbrunnor, Best, Hanhecken and Pancka were present., (Ex. 433,
Book 205, Ribbbntrop was absent because of illness., ^Hannecken
wag Military Commander' in Denmark .^d panoke v;as the nOwly-appointed SS
and police Leader.for Denmark.

At the conclusion of the conference, which

chiefly"Concerned sabotage acts in-Dermiark', Hitler ordered that the sD

should embark on a systematic counter-terror program.

(Ibid., P. 41 of

translation-. )
t

•

A few words should bo said about the meaning of this phrase, "counter-

terror,"

The theory of it was very simple.

It was a pure reprisal
r

measure in which the element of doubt and uncertainty was to increase

the deterrent effect causod by the deaths of the victims or by thp

destruction of property.

For example, a German soldier would be shot

by some unknown person on Pfonday night.

On Tuesday night, some Danish

citizen, who had be^on classified by the SD as "unsympathetic" toward the
Germans in his attitude, would be set upon and murdered as he walked

home. No announcsment was made as to who had killed him, or why he was
killed.

If possible, Bovensiepen stated, he tried to arrange for a

killing in the same locality. (Ex. C-U33 supra., IPage

^3 of translation.)

To all intents and purposes the event had the superficial appearance of
a sinple murderous assault.
- 2 "- -
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If the Danish police succeeclGcl in tracinr the -nur'-^-ererj as
sometimes v/as the co.so, r.s the vfitness Larson testified, the German
police immerliatelj'- tool-: Iiim into their own custcd3rj pivinr; as their

excuse that he was a deserter from the t'ehrmacht, or seme other

such reason, (ir. 678I) 2ie -aieory was that the uncertainty and
insecurity which this ld.nd of prccram of orf^anized murder vfould

• .y\ I
-'I

have on the minds of tlio Danish population, v/ould add to the
efficacy of the killings to discourare other Danes from ccraa^.ttinr
similar acts,'

•^'hat has just boon said about the nature efJicounter-terroi'',
as 'bhis term was understoo-''. by the Foroi.-n Office, the -.rmy and
the police ae;Gncies, is not exaryoratcd or distorted in the least.

ii.t tne conference cf December 3G5 nitler "'articulr.rl^'* emphasized

.T,<

the "canouflarrc" aspects cf the propram, - that is to say, - the deliberate failure to announce cither beforehand or afterwards,
tha.t-the victims ha/l been Jcilled by German police who v/ere actinf:
under orders, or to pivo an:/ intimation as to vrh:/ the:'* had been
Irilled. Hitler said tliat tliis was a better way to rot at the

supporters (cf the resistance movement), Iho shootinp of hostares
•

-ii

Y/as still forbidden ^X3cause it had proved to be without effect

(Exh, C-).i333 ) NG-5887j Dock 205> pare-iil of translation), ds a
matter of fact, the counter-terror and sa'^otaro propram was a
variation on, the Nipht and Eop Pro/vam, the chief •difference beinr ,

ihat in the case of the Nipht and Fop victims, tlaeir families did
not know whether they were dead or alive, whereas in the case

of^ the terrot and sabota-pc victims,' all that friends or relatives
knew was that they were found l:dnp: dead in the street. The effect
scuplit in both cases was the same.

After Best returned from this conference, he had a conversation

Y/ith ST3DNGk.lCHT. (Tr, 10519) • b-liat v/as said there we do not know
precisely, but it is not too far-fetched to assume that Best mentioned

to S'feHGIti.CHT what had. been said at the conference -at the Fueh-

• ,r:

rer's headquarters. At

rate, it is unrasputed that dost in

formed S1Sd?'r?-.VT.:T about tho intention to initiate the counter-

terror :-rcprain cn a lar^e scale before the order ^ras actually nut
into offoct and tiiat STSiNGTAXHT did not raise e.nj o^-.jections.

(Tr. 10^19-10520), Both Best and STEBITGIuXHT roncatedlv sav that

r ' 12

fl'om the very outset they had the intention to niinimiHe the effect

of Hitler's order as much as yossible, and to conceal from him,
that this Tuas boiny done,
1944

.xround the berinniny of January^ the organized'bountor-terrcr"

began, Asyecial SB counter-terror Commando of the Sborscny battalion
was sent to Denmark for this ::ur:-.ose. This unit was knoim as the

'T'otcr-Groun", and its solo mission from the outset vfas to establish
a reiyn of terror throurhcut Dermar].:,

means of murderinr- ci

tizens, bloivinr un buil'hn^g and the like, (fbh, 3259, 110-5089,
Book 52 , -.liboh. 3632 ^ NG-5hU9j Bool^: 98-A , page 101-105^-,
Bxh, C-433 supraj Pg. 41-^!3c-f translation) Ihe leader of this
g^up was Schwerdt, Ho worked cn the direct order of Bovensiepen

the newly arrived Chief of the SIPO and SD who had replaced "ildner.
• (ihdi, 3*^33 3 NG-5hl9 Book 9^ uapo 108).
Best was kept complotoly informe-". about the activities of this

eTcup byBovonsiopon who rG:,ortod to him continually

3632

. supra p, 102), Before Bovonsiopon T/ont to Denmark he had boon

ox]_:)licitly instructed, bp Kaltenbrunner that he was to keep in
close content with Best concerninr; the counter-terror profTam and.

tliat in fact, ho should submit te Best, lists'of prospective vic
tims before they were actiually killed so that Best coul'l have the
opportunity to disapprove of any names contained therein.

Ilxcee.ilnp' this, Best picked victims and objocts for counterterror ,on his ovm initiative and had Bovensiepen order them to be

carriod out,. (Bxh. 3o'32,
Bock 9Q^ yar-o 103-105) Perlorlically, in faet, almost c'.cdly, Dost reported on'iho progress of '
the counter-terrcr acts to the Foroirn Of-rico, He referred to
I ••

-

• - r-

m

ccuntcr-torror victims ?.nd objects as "Anti-German(Exh. 3631^
NG-5176j Boc]^ 98-A^ p. 8U-99)» STEEWGiiACHT read and distributed
all these reports (soalod matter teloframs) and a system v;as devised
whereby the reader could ascertain net only -that the person shot

was a victim of the SB but also the particular act in retaliation

"Cor which any particular victim had been killed. Thus the telcpram
which SIEENCSIAOHT received on "'"'"ednosday reportinp the death of the
Dane

would refer back to an earlier telegram r eceivcd cn Ken-

day which reported the killing cf the German "f

A specific example is the telegram by Best to the Foreign. Offi<2e
dated 31 Januarjr 19UU, "t/hich wa.s distribute'•

by STEIINSIIGHT to the

'

various departments, (E:d.i, 3^31 supra p, 89). "
"In Copenhagen, a naval lieutenant was shot at in the
street by unlcnown persons. For this assault I imposed

a fine of 2 million Kronen, Injad-ition counter-mea-^
surcs will__bc t;rihen alonr- ttio lines
instructions,"

^

Two days later Best reported results to the Foreirn Office. 'This

telegram vfas also distributed by STEENGH'^OHT. (T^Jld p,9l).
"Also in Copenhagen, the cjiti-Gem.an Captain in the
Body-Guards, Count Kielebrokonhuus-Schack was shot,
at receiving .dangerous injuries, and a Dajiish Polico

officer was shot, (ln_thia connectionjrcfcr^ncc^i^ made
sentencei)"
. STEErlGItvCKT vras in a position, therefore, to follow the
course of this scheme almost VAow-b-'"-blow, Even his subordinates

testi'iled that they know about it, Griui'-'^horr admitted that '51ost

continually kept the doroirn Office informed of all acts of counter-

terror carried out",

(Tr, IOII9) and that from a telegram which

SIEEWGiiii IHT ha.-l distributed to him:

'

"I knew that counter-terror measures were carried out,

and secondly, "th'it it was carried out by sabotage groups,
be they agents or the Schalburg Corps or the police;
and that accordinr;- to "this one telegram, Best seemsd

to decid;e upon a certain extent of these counter—terror

raeasiircs." (Tr. 18123)
He also said that he discussed counter—"terror with his superior,

Hencke, chief of the politieal ddvision (Tr. 18120), Hencke in his
-
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turn testified that the question of counter-terror was politically
i'-iportant:

"1^.

Nor;, the question of counter-terror was an inportojit
question politically, as v/ell as cthcrvdse, vjith
rerard ot 7creirn Office activities in Dermiark,
i s n ' t that correct?

"A,

Undoubtedly-, for the" Foreign Office it rvas ccC. parti
cular interest. (Tr. 19476

Hencko also recalled hardn.q had a conversation vdth Best in April,

IShh, on the counter-terror question (Exh, 3631j NG-5176, Doc.H-^.
-A

9% paye 99; "Cr. 19473). It is hard to understand therefore,
he meant

SFldNr-:L.OHT what/when he testified that he was not told by Dost
alx)ut the "details" of tho counter-terror program. It may be that

he v/as not yTeciSely informed as to whether "X" had been shot iDot•T;eon the eyes or tlirouph the left temple, nor whether his body was

left lydny on tho street or throv/n into a canal, but he was cer

tainly told, incident by incident, ateut tho various individuals
v/ho were killed.^ and the whole subject of countGr-torrcr in Den
mark sevens tc have be~n yonorally discussed by his subordinates.
Actually, S'SDNGIL^CHT's testimony is contradictory on this
point,

the one hrnd. ho said that he wo-s not told about tho

"details" (IT, p. lOl^l) and on the other hand he states that he,

his other "conspirators" Ilciicko, Grundherr and Best workodu hand-

in-ylovo to try to defeat or at least to impede as much as possible,
the purposes which Hitler had in

mind for tho counter-terror pro

gram. ('fr. p, 10574-76), The testimony is undisputed that the re
lationship betv/eon STElNGiUCHT and BEST remained good from the

ti

that the former was elevated to the dignity of a State Secre

taryship until the end of tiie war. Both men repeatedly referrdd

to tho "cordial and. close relationship " which oxisted bclw/ecn them,
and. to tho high esteem in 7;hich each r ogarded the other. In view of
this relationship, and in view of the cons-Unt official corrcspon-

d.encd which was passing 'oetwoon them, it soems rather fantastic to

•

believe that STSBNG51ACHT was not kept thoroughly informed of develop

yl'k

ments in Denmark.
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On tliG contrary, STESNC-RACHT also received statistical
reports concerning counter-terror from BEST sucii as
B0VEN8IERH.'N*s monthly reports on the activities of
the StPO and SD in Denmark (Eich*-c-429} HG- 3019, Book 205

p,44) in v/hich the countor-tcrror acts v^erc listed. On
6 July 1944 BEST gave STSBi^GR_AOHT and the Foreign Office
an estimate of counter-terror acts during the first
half of 1944. He boastfully stated then

•* I repeat my verbal report that during
the first half year of 1944, 24 countcr.terror operations took place against
persons and that 32 counter-sabotage

measures ('denolltion of plants, hostile
to Germany, nev/spapcrs, etc.) were
carried out." (Exh,149S NG-4007 Book 52,

p.7 of translation.)
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the German
countGr-terror v^as an utterly criminal scheme.
The remarks made by Tribunal Y in the case of the

United States v. Y/ilheln Lcob, ct al, concerning the
legality of hostage executions have already been
quoted. If it is illegal as both that Court as well

,

as Tribunal Y in the case of United States v.Uilhclm

List ct al, held, to slioot hostages without first

making elaborated announcements and warnings which arc

specified in

the latter opinion, it can scarcely bo

contended that the kind of conduct engaged in by the

murderer acting- under the command of Schwerdt and nis
successor, Issel, can be condoned

-

3.5 -

more outrageous

and unwarrantable brcec.'i of all civilized behavior can

hardly be

l.s the I)-nish Court in discussing

the 'teounter-texrof prograri, in surprisingly noderate
language has

scid:

"According to the Hitler order of 30 December

1943) countcr-sobotage, as mentioned before,
was to take place under cover; that is, the
G-er xan authorities were not to appear as the

responsible agencies. That was also the way
it was finally carried out. hpart from the

already mentioned official blastings, nothing
-was published about the acts of the snecial

commandos, v/ho had been sent from Germany,

Their acts were always preceded by Danish acts,

and they acted in so arbitrary a manner that in

many cases it v;as difficult to know against

whom thcy^Tvcre directed, U-der these circum
stances, it can be understood that the minimum

co'iditions-which might legalize tZac reprisal

acts were not adhered to, i.e. tZiat the opponent
IS informed that t.hls is a reprisal action or
suc.h becomes clearly evident from tiee action

itself,- furt.heriorc, it is to be shown against
which action or actions of the opponent the
reprisal action is directed. In t.hc course

of the frequently mentioned Hitler conference
Oj. 30 -cccmber, 1943, in which the defendants

.-cst, von Hanncckcn ^nd Hancke took part, it

was ordered that reprisal measures which had '

^^^2' to be givenfar,
as shooting
were
up. suc.h
In view
of t.hat, hostages,
and in
viev.r of the extraordinary nature of camouflaged
counter-sabotage, the Tribunal docs not hesitate
the defendants .:iust leave realised

t.iat t.-.at form of counter-sabotage was illencl,..

(Danish City Court of Copcnliayon v. Sast, H...„_cc:5:en,
Panokc and Eovcnsiopcn. Exhibit Zio. C- 433,. NG-5887,
Book 205, page 63-64 of transl^^tion.)
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STS^NG-RACHT hinsclf

a trrancd. lowycr. He knew perfect

ly well tket tf^is entire sc'"c.'ic violotcd every prin

ciple of civilized lew. TIlc first tine he lieerd of it,
he occupied u position which.- required han to give his
advice on the legality a:id advisability of such nat
ters to von Hibbcntrop.- '.'/c know that on various occa

sions he did 'nanegc to change ••ron Rlbbcn.trop *s "iindo
-:_t the scjnc tine ho occupi.d a position where ho
'4

frcquc -tly r.^^ctcd as Best's superior. For czanple, as
will presently be. shown,tefcre the 26-27th of duly,'
1944, he sun-ioncd B., at to B-.rlxn to call hin to

account for the unpleasant turn which events lead taken

in Dennurk. On a previous occasion he, instructed Best

^ not to allow

executions of persons bonvictcd before

SCcourts until the sentences h-d been approved by the
Foreign Office, i E.;h. -3634,

5131, Bocuncnt-Bwok

93 A.'p, 112) .
t

h^c suhnit that STJIEN-^RACHT o;.ed the clear duty to
protest against this vicious plan and if his protests
were unavailing, to refuse to rcnci;i in a position
where he knew that his sufeordinetea • .v ¥\rcre systcaatically engaged in a canpaign of -.urdcr. But BT^.^NGRhCHB
never node any such protests. He testified how fron

tine to tine, because of t.iie especially doge rclationship which existed between .'linsclf and Ribbcntrop,
he w^s able to
-

.-'Siii
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bring his chief to change his apinion, but so far as hny cretiible
evidence sHoT3;-he*r:ever ut't-i^ed-a- syllable-of-'protest

"

to

Ribbentrop about this entire counter—terror program*
¥e further submit that by remaining in office after he had

been thoroughly apprised of the ex^t turn which events v;ere
taking in Denmark, he became an accessory to the execution of

the counter-terror scheme* But SUMGR/XCIfT' a participation in

the seheme did not end with his failure to protest against it,
and with his knowledge of what was. happenings

3n July, 1944j a series of complicated events took place

which resulted in a general strike at Oopenhagenu. Ribbentrop.
became,very much alarmed about this, and told SIEENGRAGHT to
aummon Best to Berlin and to find out v/hsther the events in

Copenhagen, v/ere the result of bad judgement or of poorly
conceived policy ouBeat'a part* According to Best,. SIEMGRACHT
tried to protect and excuse him in this matter* Best went to

Berlin and had a conference vdth STEENGRAGKT, but the report

which the latter made as the result of the conference, com
pletely exculpated Best. (Tr* 10. 149)* Among other things,
Best had suggested that the infamous "Night and Fog Program"

Tirtiich was in full, swing in Belgium, France., Hollsnd and Norv/ay,
also be made applicable to Denmark* Asecond suggested panacea
was that a series of "ruthless reprisal murders and reprisal

sabotage acts" be instituted in Denmark. (Ex* I50Q, NG-488Q,
DB. 52:, p.

This, of course, only amounted to an

intensification of the counter-terror program, which v;as
already in force there* STEMGRACHT passed along both of these
suggestions to Ribbentrop in his report, with the comment that

he, STEENGRACHT, had considered both of these suggestions to be

"useful"* (Ex* 1500, NG h360, DB* 52, p. 27). Here we have an
eaQ>resaion by STEENffliAGHT which amounted not bnOy to an
®ipproval of all of the raui?ders which had been previously
-
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Garried out in Denmark^^ but to a recommendation that the murder
program be extended and aGcelerated*

The making of such a recommendation v/ould be sufficiently

shocking^ even if the person v/ho made it believed that it ~/asjustified»- But the evidence here seems to indicate that STESN—

G-RACHT v/as not particularly interested in what the actual facta

in Denmark were, and that his only aim, interest^ or object in
this %7hole affair was to save Best* a skin» If a few acore Danes
had to be shot in order to accomplish this all—important end,

that was apparently regarded as of no particular consequence*

STEENGRACHT almost said as much, when, in the course of describ

I

ing the preparation of his report to Ribbentrop on the results
of the "investigation" of Best, he testified:

"I requested Best to prepare a document of

Justification and to submit it to me* I told

him that I would state his attitude to be

correct and I, on cy part, \7ould add a few
special items, or would underscore a few
special items*"

(Tc* 10151)-

The last two documents alluded to constitute,

respectively, the Justification which Best prepared for him
self and the "special items" added by STEBtlGRACHT* It is

interesting to note that in this report, STMJGRACHT remark
ed that he had instructed Best to keep in mind that "all

softness and mercy was out of place"*

1500, supraj * The

advice seems to have been taken literally, because an

examination of the statistics reveals that the majority of
the butcheries committed by members of the "Peter grouo?

tooJc Elace after SOIENGHACIIT had his meeting v/ith Best.
(Ex. 3259, HG-5089, IB. 52, E. )♦
meetuig between
Best and STEMCBMJKT was almost immediately followed by
of the most brutal murders in the entire list: the killing of
Snog Ohristensen, who was kidnappea and shot before his body

was. flung into amoore.

3633,.
-
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98^, P. 110)

SOSSNGRACHT had al^o self-righteously said that the severe
measures which he recoamcrirjod wore "also in the best interests

of the Danes". He repeated this on the witnesa-stand (Tr.liOIA?)o
Ebviously, the Danes simply did not lolow what was good for them.
But it is rather difficult, even for ^hose of us who have had the

benefit of listening to STEBHGRAOHT arid, his witnesses, to under^
stand how the interests of the Danish people were served by the
systematic murders of many of them during this counte3>-terror

program; or hov/ even the Gennan interests v/ere served by the
continuation of the program even after the Allied armies had

entered the Reich and Germany's defeat T/aa a foregone

conclusion. (Tr. 10576, 1812Q). perhaps it is merely that we
are deficient in imagination.

-
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CCNCUJSION

•'?'e have reviewed in some detail the register of criines coinmit'ted

in German-occupied France and renmark >y teen who were ultimately ac

ting under orders of the Foreign Office,

have shown that these cri

mes v/ere systematically and thoroughly reported to Berlin, and that
STEENGRACHT had every opportunity, and in fact every reason, to know

definitely and precisely what was taking place. ¥e hav« seen that
STEENGRACHT, "by virtue of his position in the Foreign Office as perma

nent deputy to Ribbentrop, was in a position of authority and influenc©.- But 7/e have sought in vain for one sentence which STEENGRACHT ever

I

uttered against the brutal measures which his subordinates conceived
and carried out^ On the contrary, the evidence was that he was in com

4

plete sympathy vrith Abetz and Best. "I pointed out that it was not
important whers the people came from, but who exeoated them." This was
hisraiponse to the ohjeotion that the mass executions of Frenchmen

suggested hy Ahetz would hawe no effect in France because the intended
victims were all in Germany. "I consider that these suggestions are

*

useful." That was his reaction to Best's proposal to use "reprisal mur

ders" as one way of pacifying the Danes. These two sentences summarize

^

STEENGBACHT'8 contribution to the application of the Nazi "New Order
in German-occupied Europe and to the policy of the German Foreign

Cffioe. In other trial briefs we have revealed STEENGRACHT's partici

pation in the murder of millions of lews all over Europe (Count V)
and his participation with killing of Allied prisoners of War (Count
III).

Thus we see that STEENGBACHT, during his two years as State Secre

tary (May 1943 - May 1945) participated knowingly in the development
and promotion of the various murder schemes of bis government.
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Page 7; Line 2:

Page 7; Line 21

Lelete "only" , replace vith "vras'
The correct citation is -Sxh. Orl75.
?"rD 12974, IB 1^8_, S 1

Page 7; Line 84;

Changs "30 S^temher 1938" to "30
Sentemher 19?9"

Page 19; Line lOs

Correct ^to "would otherwise be
jeooardized"

Page 19; Second
line

from "bottom:

Correct date should be "33 January
154Q1L, not "1948"

Page 25; Line 34i

Change "officer" to "office"

Page 125:

This page should follow.. Page 136.

Page 151!
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